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I. INTRODUCTION
Activity in North Dakota's oil and gas industry has increased significantly in the last several years. The increased oil and gas activity has
created an increase in North Dakota case law regarding oil and gas
related issues. The following is an update on North Dakota case law
related to the oil and gas industry from September 1, 2010, through
August 31, 2011. The cases address a variety of oil and gas law related
issues.
1. Mr. Friez is an attorney with Crowley Fleck PLLP in Bismarck, North Dakota.
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JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Dormant Mineral Act

Several recent North Dakota Supreme Court cases address North
Dakota's abandoned mineral statutes, otherwise known as North Dakota's Dormant Mineral Act ("The Act"). The Act, located in North
Dakota Century Code ("N.D.C.C.") Chapter 38-18.1, allows a surface
owner to acquire an abandoned mineral interest where the interest
has not been used, as defined by the code, for a period of twenty
years. The Act is the subject of the first three cases of this North
Dakota update.
1.

Sorenson v. Felton2

Michael Sorenson owned the surface of a tract of land.' Barbara
Felton acquired an interest in the minerals pursuant to a personal representative's deed recorded in the county records in 1984.4 After 1984
and prior to January 2008, Felton did not lease the minerals, file a
statement of claim, or use the minerals in any other way under the
definition of The Act.' In January 2007, in accordance with The Act,
Sorenson published a notice of lapse of mineral interest in the appropriate newspaper. 6 In addition, Sorenson mailed notice to Felton using the Florida address that appeared on the 1984 personal
representative's deed.7 Sorenson also conducted a Yahoo! People
search but found no address for Barbara Felton in Florida.8 On January 9, 2008, Felton leased her mineral interest to Schmitz Oil Properties.9 Sorenson filed a complaint to quiet title to the mineral interest
in question.1 0
Section 38-18.1-06(2) requires a notice of lapse to be sent by mail "if
the address of the mineral interest owner is shown of record or can be
determined upon reasonable inquiry."" The North Dakota Supreme
Court held that because the phrases "shown of record" and "determined upon reasonable inquiry" are separated by the word "or," they
are separate and alternative considerations for how a surface owner is
to obtain the mineral owner's address for mailing the notice.12 Therefore, Sorenson was only required to conduct a reasonable inquiry if
Felton's address was not shown of record.13 Since her address was
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Sorenson v. Felton, 793 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 2011).
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 802; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-06(2) (2004).
Felton, 793 N.W.2d at 802-03.
Id. at 803.
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shown of record on the 1984 personal representative's deed, he was
not required to conduct any further inquiry. 1 4 Because an address appears of record and because the notice was sent to the address of record, Sorenson satisfied the requirements of the statute and
successfully succeeded to the ownership of Felton's minerals.1 5
2. Sorenson v. Alinder16
Michael Sorenson owned the surface of a tract of land." Russell
Alinder and Edna Alinder acquired an interest in the minerals pursuant to a mineral deed recorded in the county records in 1953." Russell
Alinder died in 1980 and Edna Alinder died in 1999.19 After 1953,
Russell Alinder and Edna Alinder did not lease the minerals, file a
statement of claim, or use the minerals in any other way under the
definition of The Act.20 In January 2007, in accordance with the requirements of The Act, Sorenson published a notice of lapse of mineral interest in the appropriate newspaper.2 1 In addition, Sorenson
mailed notice to Russell Alinder and Edna Alinder at the Buffalo, ND
address that appeared on the 1953 mineral deed.2 2 Sorenson filed a
complaint to quiet title to the mineral interest in question.2 3
The district court held that because Sorenson did not conduct a reasonable inquiry to determine a more current address for Russell
Alinder and Edna Alinder, Sorenson did not comply with the requirements of The Act.2 4 Sorenson appealed, arguing that a reasonable
inquiry was not required because there was an address of record.25
The North Dakota Supreme Court cited their decision in Sorenson v.
Felton and held section 38-18.1-06(2) only requires a reasonable inquiry when the mineral owner's address is not shown of record.2 6 The
Court held that Sorenson complied with the requirements of the statute by mailing the notice to Russell and Edna Alinder at their address
shown of record, and he was not required to conduct any further inquiry. 27 Sorenson satisfied the requirements of the statute and successfully succeeded to the ownership of the Alinders' mineral
interest.2 8
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Sorenson v. Alinder, 793 N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 2011).
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 798-99.
Id. at 799.
Id.
Id.
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Johnson v. Taliaferro

Taliaferro has been the record owner of a mineral interest under the
disputed tract of land since June 26, 1950.30 An oil and gas leasedated July 5, 1960, and for a primary term of five years-was Taliaferro's last use of the mineral interest."1 The lease identified Taliaferro's address as 510 Petroleum Building, Abilene, TX. On June
25, 2009, the Johnsons executed a notice of lapse of mineral interest
for the disputed tract of land. On July 30, 2009, the Johnsons mailed
a copy of the notice of lapse to Taliaferro at 510 Petroleum Building,
451 Pine St., Abilene, TX 79601-5150.34 The Johnsons identified the
street address for the Petroleum Building through an Internet search
and identified the zip code using the United States Postal Service's
Internet website. Taliaferro did not receive the notice.
The Johnsons filed an action seeking to quiet title to the mineral
interest in the Johnsons.3 6 The district court quieted title to the mineral interest in the Johnsons, finding the Johnsons did not need to
conduct a reasonable inquiry under section 38-18.1-06 to find Taliaferro's current address, stating that "[W]hen an address appears of
record there is no requirement for reasonable inquiry when giving Notice of Lapse of Mineral Interest."3 Taliaferro appealed the district
court's decision, arguing that an amendment to The Act, codified in
section 38-18.1-06.1, requires the surface owner to show the court that
all the requirements of The Act were complied with, including showing the court "that a reasonable inquiry as defined by subsection 6 of
section 38-18.1-06 was conducted."3 8
The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the unique situation
where a notice of lapse was executed and sent prior to the 2009
amendments to The Act taking effect, but a quiet title action was filed
after the 2009 amendments took effect.39 The Court stated the
N.D.C.C. cannot be retroactively applied unless specifically permitted
by the legislature and that subsequent legislation cannot be used to
deprive a person of a vested right.4 0 Because the notice of lapse in
this case was executed prior to the 2009 amendments to The Act and
because The Act provides that .'[t]itle to the abandoned mineral interest vests in the owner or owners of the surface estate in the land in
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Johnson v. Taliaferro, 793 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 2011).
Id. at 805.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 806.
Id.
Id. at 807.
Id.
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or under which the mineral interest is located on the date of abandonment,"' title to this mineral interest vested in the Johnsons prior to the
2009 amendments taking effect.4 1 Thus, the Court held that its decision in Sorenson v. Felton is controlling and that the Johnsons were
not required to conduct a reasonable inquiry in this case.4 2
Because it was not necessary for the outcome of the case, the Supreme Court did not address whether the 2009 addition of section 3818.1-06.1 requires the surface owner to conduct a reasonable inquiry
under a notice of lapse and subsequent quiet title action taking place
after August 1, 2009, the effective date of the 2009 amendment.4 3
In 2009, the North Dakota legislature amended The Act. The three
dormant mineral cases discussed above were decided under the pre2009 act. Among other changes, the 2009 amendments to The Act
added section 38-18.1-06.1, which provides:
38-18.1-06.1. Perfecting title in surface owner.
1. Upon completion of the procedure provided in section 38-18.106, the owner or owners of the surface estate may maintain an
action in district court in the county in which the minerals are
located and obtain a judgment in quiet title in the owner or owners of the surface estate. This action must be brought in the same
manner and is subject to the same procedure as an action to quiet
title pursuant to chapter 32-17.
2. In an action brought under this section, the owner or owners of
the surface estate shall submit evidence to the district court establishing that all procedures required by this chapter were properly completed and that a reasonable inquiry as defined by
subsection 6 of section 38-18.1-06 was conducted. If the district
court finds that the surface owner has complied with all procedures of the chapter and has conducted a reasonably inquiry, the
district court shall issue its findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and enter judgment perfecting title to the mineral interest in the
owner or owners of the surface estate.
3. A judgment obtained by the owner or owners of the surface estate in compliance with this section is deemed conclusive except
for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.
4. A mineral lessee that obtains a lease from the owner of the surface estate, which owner has obtained a judgment to minerals
pursuant to this section, is deemed a bona fide purchaser and its
lease remains effective in the event the judgment is subsequently
vacated for any reason. Further, the lessee is not liable to any
third party for lease bonus, royalties, or any other proceeds paid
to the surface owner under the lease before the judgment being
vacated.
5. Absent fraud or misrepresentation, the owner or owners of the
surface estate which obtain a judgment under this section and
(quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-02 (2004)).
42. Id. at 806, 808.
43. Id. at 808 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
41. Id.
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lease minerals to a lessee are entitled to retain all lease bonus,
royalties, or any other proceeds paid to the surface owner under
the lease before the judgment being vacated."
As shown above, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held that section 38-18.1-06 requires a reasonable inquiry only when there is no
address of record. 4 5 However, section 38-18.1-06.1, enacted July 1,
2009, expressly allows the surface owner to maintain an action to quiet
title.4 6 Section 38-18.1-06.1(2) requires the surface owner to "submit
evidence to the district court establishing that all procedures required
by this chapter were properly completed and that a reasonable inquiry
as defined by subsection 6 of section 38-18.1-06 was conducted."4 7 "If
the district court finds that the surface owner has complied with all
procedures of the chapter and has conducted a reasonable inquiry, the
district court shall issue its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
enter judgment perfecting title to the mineral interest in the owner or
owners of the surface estate." 48 Because section 38-18.1-06.1(2) requires the surface owner to submit evidence that a reasonable inquiry
was conducted and uses the word "and" and not "or," it is an open
question whether a surface owner, who attempts to succeed to dormant minerals under the post-2009 act must still conduct a reasonable
inquiry despite the Supreme Court's holdings under the pre-2009
act.4 9 The Chief Justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court discussed this open question in his concurrence to Johnson v. Taliaferro,
stating:
I write separately to highlight the issue outlined in 1 15 of the majority opinion, i.e., whether or not title to a severed mineral interest
abandoned under N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-06 and vested in the surface
owner prior to 2009 can be quieted in an action brought by the surface owner after the effective date of the 2009 amendments to
N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-06(2) without conducting a reasonable inquiry
as to the owner of the mineral interest. Our answer is that title can
be quieted without conducting a reasonable search. But, I note our
decision does not resolve the issue of whether or not, in light of the
2009 amendments to N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-06.1(2), a quiet title action
would lie or whether or not a severed mineral interest would even
be considered abandoned under the provisions of N.D.C.C. § 3818.1-06 if the procedures under § 38-18.1-06 were begun after the
2009 amendments to § 38.18.1-06.1(2) became effective and no reasonable inquiry was conducted. I believe this is an open question
44. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-06.1 (Supp. 2011).
45. See Sorenson v. Felton, 793 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 2011); Sorenson v. Alinder, 793
N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 2011); Taliaferro, 793 N.W.2d at 804.
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-06.1(1).
47. Id. § 38-18.1-06.1(2) (Supp. 2011).
48. Id.

49. Id. § 38.18.1-06.1; see also Taliaferro, 793 N.W.2d at 808 (VandeWalle, C.J.,
concurring).
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that invites further legislative clarification or awaits a judicial
determination.5 0
B.

Other Case Law

1. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer"

Irish Oil and Gas Inc. ("Irish") entered into oil and gas leases with
Gerald C. Riemer, Doris E. Riemer, Lillie J. Riemer, and Joanne
Johnson (the "Riemers") in January and February 2008.52 A Letter
Agreement accompanied each lease and provided an offer of bonus
consideration of $160 per net mineral acre and a 1/6 royalty in the
event of production." The Letter Agreement also provided that
within 60 days of receipt of the signed lease, "subject to approval of
title, with right of payment extension of 30 additional days, in the
event of title curative issues, from expiration of original 60 days" the
Riemers would receive a check for $10,640.54
Because he had not yet received a check for the bonus consideration, Gerald C. Riemer called Irish and spoke with Tim Furlong, vice
president of Irish, regarding the bonus consideration." Following the
conversation, Irish sent a letter to Riemer purporting that Riemer
agreed to extend the payment deadline to June 15.56 Irish explained it
needed more time because it had encountered title issues." Irish ensured it would communicate with Riemer if the payment was to be
delayed past June 15.5 Gerald C. Riemer claimed he did not agree to
extend the deadline for payment by Irish, while Irish claimed Gerald
Riemer agreed to an extension.
On April 30, 2008 Gerald C. Riemer leased the same mineral interest to Continental Oil Company.6 0 Subsequently, Irish mailed the
Riemers a check for the bonus consideration owed." The Riemers
returned the check along with a letter indicating the minerals had
been leased to another company.6 2 Irish sued the Riemers alleging
breach of contract.
Paragraph 16 of the oil and gas leases provided:
50. Taliaferro, 793 N.W.2d at 808 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
51. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 794 N.W.2d 715 (N.D. 2011).
52. Id. at 716.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.

56. Id. at 716-17.
57. Id. at 717.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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This lease shall not be terminated, forfeited, or canceled for failure
by Lessee to perform in whole or in part any of its implied covenants, conditions, or stipulations until it shall have been first finally
and judicially determined that the failure or default exists, and then
Lessee shall be given a reasonable time to correct any default so
determined, or at Lessee's election it may surrender the Lease with
the option of reserving under the terms of this Lease each producing well and forty (40) acres surrounding it as selected by Lessee,
together with the right of ingress and egress. Lessee shall not be
liable in damages for breach of any implied covenant or
obligation.'
Irish argued this paragraph requires Riemer to obtain a judicial determination of a breach and allows the lessee a reasonable time to cure
the breach.6 5 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision that the phrase "implied covenants, conditions or stipulations"
does not apply to express provisions of the lease.66 Thus, this provision applies to the implied covenants found in the oil and gas lease
and not to the obligation to pay the lease bonus. 7
The district court held there was a total failure of consideration because Irish failed to timely pay the bonus. 68 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a factual determination.6 9 The Supreme
Court held that it could not say, as a matter of law, that the potential
for royalty from production is not sufficient consideration to support
the lease. 70 The Court also could not say that failure to timely pay the
bonus leaves the leases with a total failure of consideration that excused Riemers' performance." Rather, the Court stated a fact issue
exists as to whether the anticipated royalty payments provided for in
the royalty clauses of the leases provide adequate consideration to uphold the contract even where the bonus consideration fails.72
2. Anderson v. Hess Corp.7
The Andersons owned mineral interests and leased those interests
to Diamond Resources, Inc. through oil and gas leases dated May 3,
2004, and May 10, 2004.74 Diamond assigned the leases to Duncan,
who assigned them to Hess.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 718.
at 719.
at
at
at
at

718.
722.
721.
722.

72. Id. at 721-22.
73. Anderson v. Hess Corp., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (D.N.D. 2010), affd, 649 F.3d
891 (8th Cir. 2011).
74. Id. at 1101.
75. Id. at 1101-02.
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The leases contained the following habendum clause:
It is agreed that this lease shall remain in force for a term of five (5)
years from this date and as long thereafter as oil or gas of whatsoever nature or kind is produced from said leased premises or on
acreage pooled therewith, or drilling operations are continued as
hereinafter provided. If, at the expiration of the primary term of
this lease, oil or gas is not being produced on the leased premises or
on acreage pooled therewith but Lessee is then engaged in drilling
or re-working operations thereon, then this lease shall continue in
force so long as operations are being continuously prosecuted on

the leased premises or on acreage pooled therewith; and operations
shall be considered to be continuously prosecuted if not more than
ninety (90) days shall elapse between the completion or abandonment of one well and the beginning of operations for the drilling of
another well. If after discovery of oil or gas on said land or on acreage pooled therewith, the production thereof shall cease from any
cause after the primary term, this lease shall not terminate if Lessee
commences additional drilling or reworking operations within
ninety (90) days from date of cessation of production or from date
of completion of dry hole. If oil or gas shall be discovered and produced as a result of such operations at or after the expiration of the
primary term of this lease, this lease shall continue in force so long
as oil or gas is produced from the leased premises or on acreage
pooled therewith.
In October 2008, Hess began preparations for a well on the leased
land." From January to May 2009, Hess moved equipment to the
well, began to prepare the surface, leveled and lazered the pad, dug
the drilling pit, widened the access road to the well, drilled the rat
hole, and made other preparations for drilling.7 8 Problems at another
well prevented Hess from completing its plans to move a rig to the
well prior to May 3, 2009.79 Hess spud the well on May 11, 2009, after
which it was continuously drilled until total depth was reached on
June 26, 2009.8o The well produced continuously since June 30, 2009.81
On May 7, 2009, Hess attempted to extend the lease term by offering to increase the royalty.82 The Andersons rejected the offer on
May 8, 2009.8 The Andersons subsequently filed a complaint alleging
the leases expired because no wells were drilled prior to the lease expiration dates.' Hess argued the leases did not expire because it was
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1102 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1102-03.
Id. at 1103.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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engaged in drilling operations prior to expiration of the primary terms
of the leases.
The court reaffirmed its prior holding from Murphy v. Amoco Prod.
Co., that "drilling operations commence when (1) work is done preparatory to drilling, (2) the driller has the capability to do the actual
drilling, and (3) there is a good faith intent to complete the well. It is
not necessary that the drill bit actually penetrate the ground."8 6 Additionally, the court found that "operations" modified both "drilling"
and "reworking" and that the phrase "drilling or reworking operations" included both "drilling operations" and "reworking
operations. "87
The court also stated that actual drilling is unnecessary to extend
the lease term but that "the location of wells, hauling lumber on the
premises, erection of derricks, providing a water supply, moving machinery on the premises," and similar acts preceding the actual drilling, when paired with an actual intent to drill and subsequent drilling
of a well, constitute drilling operations. The court found that Hess
was engaged in drilling operations prior to the expiration of the primary terms of the leases. 89 Thus, the leases were effectively extended
beyond their primary terms by the completion of the well. 9 0
3. Carkuff v. Balmer91
Alice Carkuff had one son, James Carkuff, and four daughters. 92
The plaintiffs, Carkuffs, were the successors to James Carkuff, and the
defendants were the successors to the daughters. 93 On June 11, 1953,
Alice conveyed all of her interest in the oil and gas in a tract of land to
her daughters. 94 On the same day, she quit claimed the surface rights
in the tract to James Carkuff.9 ' Subsequently, on October 20, 1953,
Alice executed a quit claim deed to James for the tract whereby Alice
"does by these presents GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL, REMISE, RELEASE and QUIT-CLAIM . . . unto [James] all the right, title and
interest in and to" the subject property. 96
Later, on June 13, 1958, James executed a deed conveying the "surface rights only" back to his mother, Alice. 97 On that same date, Al85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1106-07.
Id. at 1108 (quoting W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF
Id.
Id.
Carkuff v. Balmer, 795 N.W.2d 303 (N.D. 2011).
Id. at 304.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 305, 307-08.
Id. at 305.
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ice executed a deed to James re-conveying the "surface rights only.""
On May 4, 1959, by four separate quit claim deeds, Alice's four daughters conveyed the mineral interests back to Alice, and later, on April
18, 1963, Alice again re-conveyed the mineral interests back to the
four daughters. 99 The question before the Court was whether the October 20, 1953 quit claim deed, which did not contain a mineral reservation and was not limited to surface rights, and which expressly
included the term "grant," had the effect of transferring to James all
of Alice's subsequently-acquired mineral rights under the May 4, 1959
deeds.100
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the after-acquired title doctrine "'is one under which title to land acquired by a grantor
who previously attempted to convey title to the same land which he
did not then own inures automatically to the benefit of his prior
grantee."101 That doctrine is codified at N.D.C.C. section 47-10-15,
which provides that "[w]hen a person purports by proper instrument
to grant real property in fee simple and subsequently acquires any title
or claim of title thereto, the same passes by operation of law to the
grantee or the grantee's successors."1 0 2 Generally, a quit claim deed
conveys only the grantor's interest or title, if any, in property, rather
than the property itself.10 3 The Court found that after-acquired title
by the grantor will not, as a general rule, inure to the benefit of the
grantee under a quit claim deed.' 04 Moreover, in determining
whether a quit claim has been created, "operative words of grant or
release are subordinated to words defining or restricting the interest
granted."0 5
The Court rejected the Carkuffs' argument that the use of the word
"grant" somehow "transformed" Alice's quit claim deed of all her
right, title, and interest into one which passes after-acquired interests.10 6 The Court found that, although the instrument uses the term
"grant," "it does so in reference to Alice Carkuff's 'right, title and
interest' in the property, rather than specifically 'grant[ing] the entire
fee, i.e. the property itself, to James Carkuff.""O Thus, "subordinating operative words of grant or release to words defining or restricting
the interest granted," the Court construed the deed as a quit claim
deed, which did not convey after-acquired title.'
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.

305-06.
306 (quoting Torgerson v. Rose, 339 N.W.2d 79, 82 (N.D. 1983)).
307.
308.
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In so holding, the focus of the Court's attention was on the interest
purportedly conveyed, rather than the operative language used to
make the conveyance.' 0 9 Had Alice executed a quit claim deed of the
land itself (using the term "grant"), rather than all of her interest in
the land, the Court may have reached a different conclusion.
4. Johnson v. Hovland

0

In 1976, Mathilda Olson conveyed a 50% mineral interest in certain
land to her daughter, Bertha Hoviand, who, at the time, was married
to Lambert Hovland."' The deed was executed on March 22, 1976,
and recorded on March 23, 1976.112 Two days later, the deed was rerecorded, this time containing additional language stating an intention
to grant Bertha a life estate interest in the 50% mineral interest
(rather than fee simple title as originally granted) with the remainder
to Robert Liebl and others (the "Liebls"), who were Bertha's children
and grandchildren from a prior marriage.113 The re-recorded deed
was not re-executed or re-acknowledged before a notary public." 4
Bertha died in 1978, and Lambert died in 1983.11s Probate proceedings for both estates did not include the mineral interest at issue.116
Under the intestacy laws in effect at the time, Lambert Hovland's estate was entitled to one-half of Bertha Hovland's estate, while the
Liebls were collectively entitled to the other one-half."' The Hovlands claimed their fee interest under the originally recorded deed,
while the Liebls claimed that they were entitled to the entire remainder interest in the minerals upon Bertha's death under the re-recorded deed."18
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the re-recorded mineral deed was invalid on its face and was not a valid corrective deed." 9
The Court found that, for a corrective deed to be effective, the same
grantor that executed the original deed must execute the corrective
deed. 12 0 In addition, "'[w]here the grantor has divested himself or
herself of title, although by mistake he or she has not conveyed the
title in the way in which he or she intended, he or she may not by a
subsequent conveyance correct the mistake, there being no title re109. Id.
110. Johnson v. Hoviand, 795 N.W.2d 294 (N.D. 2011).
111. Id. at 296.

112. Id.
113. Id.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 296-97.
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id. at 301.
Id.
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maining to convey."'2 As title had already been conveyed as a result
of the originally recorded mineral deed, to be entitled to judgment,
the Liebls could only pursue a reformation of that originally recorded

deed. 122

In that regard, the Court held that the Liebls did not present sufficient evidence to support a reformation claim. 123 The Court found
insufficient an affidavit of the attorney who prepared the deed, both
as originally recorded and as re-recorded. 124 The affidavit stated that
the attorney represented Mathilda and that the intent of both Mathilda and Bertha was for Bertha to receive a life estate interest, with
the remainder interest to the Liebls.125 The Court noted that, while
the affidavit purports to set forth the intent of both parties, the affidavit indicates that the attorney only represented Mathilda, not Bertha.126 The Court noted that "[t]his is particularly relevant since the
alleged 'mutual intention' ultimately reduces or limits Bertha Hovland's estate in the mineral interests to a life estate."12 7 In addition,
although the Liebls executed various instruments throughout the
years purporting to claim an interest in the minerals, including oil and
gas leases and stipulations as to how the remainder interests were to
be owned, the Court found that this was not evidence of Bertha's intent. 128 In short, there was "no documentary evidence expressing Bertha Hovland's intent and no other testimonial evidence in the

record." 129
5.

Motschman v Bridgepoint Mineral Acquisition Fund 3 0

Motschman owned a mineral interest in a tract of land.13 1
Bridgepoint sent a letter to Motschman, offering to purchase his mineral interest for $600 per acre.13 2 Motschman sent a return letter indicating his interest in selling his mineral interest.13 3 Bridgepoint then
sent a letter, along with a mineral deed, to Motschman and included a
sight draft for $63,996.00.134 The letter instructed Motschman to sign
and notarize the deed and then deposit the draft."3 s Due to an error
121. Id. (quoting 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 43 (2001)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 302.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Motschman v. Bridgepoint Mineral Acquisition Fund, L.L.C., 795 N.W.2d 327
(N.D. 2011).
131. Id. at 329.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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with Motschman's name, Bridgepoint sent a corrective mineral deed,
which Motschman signed in the presence of a notary.1 36 Bridgepoint
then sent Motschman a check for $63,996.00.137 Subsequently,
Motschman sent a letter to Bridgepoint claiming he did not intend to
sell his minerals; rather, he only intended to lease them.'3 8
Bridgepoint informed Motschman that the sale was final because the
contract was completed and the deed was recorded.1 3 9
Motschman sued Bridgepoint arguing that consideration for the
contract failed because he never cashed the $63,996.00 check.14 0 The
North Dakota Supreme Court held that consideration does not fail
simply because a party refuses to cash a check.1 41 If Motschman objected to the form of payment, then he was obligated to voice his objection to the form of payment at the time it was tendered.14 2 Because
Motschman did not object to the form of payment, the tender of a
cashier's check instead of cash did not invalidate the contract. 14 3
6. Jensen v. Rudman Partnership& Hess Corp.'"

The Rudman Partnership ("Rudman") and Hess Corporation
("Hess") each owned part of an oil and gas lease covering approximately 880 acres in Mountrail County, North Dakota.145 The lease
was executed August 5, 1949, and had been held by continuous production of oil and gas from part of the leased premises, while other
lands covered by the lease never had production.146 The plaintiffs, as
successors-in-interest to the original lessors, served a Notice of Demand for Further Development of the non-producing tracts upon both
Rudman and Hess on November 24, 2009.14 The plaintiffs subsequently brought an action claiming that Rudman and Hess breached
the implied covenant to further develop, the implied covenant of reasonable exploration, and the implied covenant not to hold leases for
speculative purposes by failing to develop the non-producing tracts for
over sixty-one years.148
The court confirmed that development is not limited only to drilling
operations.149 Rudman and Hess presented evidence of development
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 331.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Jensen v. Rudman P'ship & Hess Corp., No. 4:10-cv-00027, 2011 WL 1791102
(D.N.D. May 10, 2011).
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id. at *1-2.
147. Id. at *1.
148. Id. at *2.
149. Id. at *3.
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upon the non-producing tracts including the completion and evaluation of a seismic shoot, the drilling of a well, review of drilling reports
from nearby wells, and the evaluation of surrounding lands and producing wells in the area."so The Plaintiffs acknowledged that these
were development activities but alleged that because they did not occur until nearly sixty years after execution of the lease, the lease
should be forfeited for breach of the implied covenants.15 1 The court
explained that a lessor alleging a breach of an implied covenant is not
entitled to forfeiture until the lessee has been given notice of the
breach, a demand for compliance with the covenant has been made,
and a reasonable time for compliance has been given.152 Because
Rudman and Hess had conducted development activities upon the
non-producing premises immediately prior to and after the demand
for development, the fact that there had previously been nearly sixty
years of non-development was not sufficient to create a fact issue, and
the court granted summary judgment in favor of Rudman and Hess,
dismissing the lessor's claims."s

7.

Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P. v. Lario Oil & Gas Co.'54

Helen Testerman owned a mineral interest in a tract of land in
North Dakota."' In 1989, Testerman, a California resident, executed
a will devising her 'share of the Mineral Rights in North Dakota to
my nephew, John H. Avery.'"156 In her will, Testerman also devised
other property to her children, Monte C. Testerman and Colleen D.
Pando, and to her niece, Georgette 0. Navarro.'57 Following the execution of her will, Testerman acquired additional mineral interests in
North Dakota from her brother when he died in 1996 ("additional
mineral interest"). 5 8
Helen Testerman died on January 28, 2004 and probate proceedings
for her estate were conducted in California.15 9 The California probate
court issued an order closing her estate and distributed the North Dakota mineral interests to Avery, a sum of cash to Navarro, and the
residue of the estate to Pando and Monte Testerman.16 0
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at *5-6
Id. at *6.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Hamill, 392 N.W.2d 55, 58-59 (N.D. 1986)).
Id. at *7.
Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P. v. Lario Oil & Gas Co., 801 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 2011).
Id. at 680.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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On August 25, 2007, Avery entered into an oil and gas lease with
the Dublin Company.' 6 ' The lease was recorded September 5, 2007,
and later assigned to Lario Oil & Gas Company ("Lario").16 2
In July 2008, Pando filed probate proceedings in North Dakota for
the estate of Helen Testerman.16 3 Avery filed a petition with the
North Dakota probate court seeking an order to distribute the North
Dakota mineral interests to Avery in accordance with the California
probate court order.164 Meanwhile, Navarro filed a motion with the
California probate court seeking to set aside the order contending that
the deed by which Testerman acquired the additional mineral interest
from her brother's estate contained handwritten language, written by
Testerman, stating "these mineral rights go to Georgette Navarro by
Helen Testerman."1 65 Navarro asked the California probate court to
issue a revised order distributing the additional mineral interest to
Navarro in accordance with the handwritten directive.166
On October 21, 2008, Navarro entered into an oil and gas lease with
The Triple T, Inc. ("Triple T"), covering the subject tract.16 7 The lease
was recorded on October 31, 2008, and Triple T subsequently assigned
an 80% net revenue interest in the lease to Brigham Oil and Gas, L.P.
("Brigham").16 8
Subsequently, through the North Dakota probate proceedings, Avery and Navarro executed an agreement wherein they stipulated and
agreed that Avery would receive 100% of the mineral interest Testerman owned of record when her will was executed and that Avery
would receive 25% of the additional mineral interest Testerman acquired from her brother's estate, with the remaining 75% of the additional mineral interest to be owned by Navarro.169 Avery and
Navarro did not provide notice of the agreement to Dublin, Triple T,
Brigham, or Lario, and those companies were not parties to the agreement.170 On November 4, 2008, the personal representative of Testerman's estate executed deeds distributing the mineral interests in
accordance with the agreement between Testerman and Navarro.' 7 1
The deeds were recorded on December 12, 2008.172
Thereafter, Brigham commenced this action alleging it was entitled
to its appropriate percentage of production from the oil and gas lease
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 680-81.
at 681.
at 680-81.
at 681.
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executed by Navarro and that Lario was wrongfully claiming 100% of
the production from the mineral interests through its lease with Avery. 73 Brigham argued that Navarro's lease covered the interest she
acquired through the agreement and subsequent personal representative's deed.17 4
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that under section 30.1-1201, "[u]pon the death of a person, the decedent's real and personal
property devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by the decedent's last will . . . , subject to administration.""' The Supreme Court

held that because Testerman's will devised her North Dakota mineral
interests to Avery, Avery had an ownership interest in the mineral
interests upon Testerman's death, subject to administration.17 6 Because the California probate court order provided that Testerman's
mineral interests passed to Avery, Avery acquired all of Testerman's
North Dakota mineral interests at the time of her death subject to
administration of the estate in North Dakota. 177 In addition, the
Court held that, as a matter of law, under sections 30.1-20-12 and 30.122-01, although the agreement is binding upon Avery and Navarro, it
is not binding upon Brigham or Lario.17 1 Thus, the deeds of distribution issued by the personal representative of the estate were ineffective to alter the interests of anyone not a party to the agreement.179
Accordingly, because Avery owned the entire interest when he executed the lease to Dublin, subject to administration of the estate, Dublin acquired the lease from the party who owned the entire mineral
interest. 80 When Triple T acquired its lease from Navarro, prior to
the agreement, Navarro did not have equitable, record, or legal title to
the mineral interest."s' Therefore, the Court held the Dublin lease
covers the entire mineral interest at issue.182
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.

681-82.
682.
683 (quoting N.D.

CENT. CODE

§ 30.1-12-01 (2004)).

685.
686.
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